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NOTE
The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away:
State v. Fernandez-Returning Louisiana's Children to an
Adult Standard
The State of Louisiana has a history of prohibiting juveniles from doing many
things. They cannot purchase alcohol until they are twenty-one.' They cannot buy
any form of tobacco products.' Persons younger than twenty-one cannot gamble
in casinos or be exposed to video poker The state prohibits juveniles from driving
before the age of sixteen, and even then they cannot drive late at night.4 The
Louisiana Legislature created these laws to protectjuveniles from the consequences
of their own immaturity.5 However, according to the recent Louisiana Supreme
Court decision in State v. Fernandez,' they may be mature enough to waive their
Miranda rights without any consultation from an adult. This decision overruled
twenty years of jurisprudence based on In re Dino.7 Dino was a Louisiana
Supreme Court decision holding that juveniles were incapable of effecting a valid
waiver of their Constitutional rights without consultation with an adult.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision,
Miranda v. Arizona,8 which required that a person in a custodial interrogation be
informed of his constitutional right to remain silent, to have an attorney, and to be
informed that if he waives his right to remain silent, anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law. Since this time, courts and scholars have constantly
debated how a suspect might waive these rights. Although the Supreme Court has
recognized that due process rights apply to juveniles in custody,' states disagree
about howjuveniles can waive these rights. More than two decades ago, Louisiana
first addressed this issue. In In re Dino,10 the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted
a strict per se approach to decide whether a child had validly waived his rights in
an interrogation. Based on empirical evidence and the findings of other jurisdic-
tions, the court determined that a juvenile could not effectively waive his Miranda
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. La. R.S. 14:93.11 (Supp. 1999).
2. La. R.S. 14:91.8 (Supp. 1999).
3. La. R.S. 33:4861.11 (Supp. 1999); La. R.S. 27:260 (Supp. 1999); La. R.S. 27:319 (Supp.
1999).
4. La. R.S. 32:405.1-407 (Supp. 1999).
5. See State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 490 (La. 1998) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
6. 712 So. 2d 485 (La. 1998).
7. 359 So. 2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047, 99 S. Ct. 722 (1978).
8. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
9. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
10. 359 So. 2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047, 99 S. Ct. 722 (1978).
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rights until he consulted with an attorney, parent, or interested adult. However, the
court recently reversed itself in State v. Fernandez1 where it held that the totality
of circumstances standard best protects the special needs ofjuveniles while serving
the interests of society and justice. The court determined that "a prophylactic rule"
imposing the requirement of advice from a parent, counsel, or interested adult is
"not appropriate."" Setting forth virtually no guidelines for courts to follow, this
decision returned Louisiana to a highly discretionary standard that is inconsistent
with Louisiana's traditional role of providing minors with increased protection
from their own immaturity."
This paper will look at the different approaches to determining what
constitutes a valid waiver of rights in ajuvenile setting, how they were created, and
how courts are applying them. It will criticize each approach, and then explain why
Louisiana should adopt a new, less discretionary approach to this problem.
II. STATE V. FERNANDEZ
A. Before Fernandez-In re Dino
In 1978, the Louisiana Supreme Court was asked to determine how a juvenile
could validly waive his Constitutional Miranda rights. In In re Dino,4 Dino's
mother took the thirteen-year-old juvenile to the police station, at the insistence of
the police. The police refused to let the mother in the room while they interrogated
the boy. Although the police considered Dino a main suspect, they never informed
his mother of this, nor was she informed of her child's rights. Alone with the
police, Dino read and listened to his rights. Afterwards, he gave an oral statement
confessing to a murder. At trial, the child claimed the officers did not explain his
rights, and he did not understand them. 5 A clinical psychologist testified that the
child was incapable of understanding the standard waiver form that the police
routinely gave to adults. 6
After noting that Louisiana adopted the requirements of Miranda in Article I,
section 13 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, 7 Justice Dennis, writing for the
11. 712So. 2d485(La. 1998).
12. Id. at 490.
13. See infra notes 198-210 and accompanying text discussing Louisiana's traditional policy of
protecting juveniles.
14. 359 So. 2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047. 99 S. Ct. 722(1978).
15. Id. at 589.
16. Id.
17. La. Const. art. 1, §13 provides:
When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or
commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention,
his right to remain silent, his right against self incrimination, his right to the assistance of
counsel and, if indigent, his right to court appointed counsel. In a criminal prosecution, an
accused shall be inforned of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. At each
stage of the proceedings, every person is entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice, or
[Vol. 60
majority, found that the police had taken Dino into custody at the time of the
interrogation, thus implicating the Miranda protections. This meant the state bore
the heavy burden of proving that Dino "knowingly and intelligently waived his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel."' 8 The court recognized the split among the circuits on how to determine
whether ajuvenile had validly waived his Miranda rights. At least one circuit 9 had
adopted the "totality of circumstances" test from West v. United States.2 ° However,
the Dino court rejected this test stating that "exclusive use of the totality of
circumstances test in relation to waivers by juveniles tends to mire the courts in a
morass of speculation similar to that from which Miranda was designed to extricate
them in adult cases."'" Instead, the majority opted for a per se approach that
requires the advice of a parent, counsel, or interested adult before the police can
obtain a valid waiver of the child's rights.22 Reasons for adoption of the new
standard were threefold: increased trustworthiness in the interrogations, removal
of subjective judgment by the police, and efficiency in the judicial process. After
reviewing other states that used a per se approach,2' the majority discussed the
standards set forth by commentators, the ABA Juvenile Justice Project, and the
Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, all of which
recommended that a juvenile's statements to an officer not be admitted into
evidence in a subsequent proceeding unless they were made after consultation with
a parent or counsel.24 The court noted that the majority of states use the totality of
circumstances test; however, it adopted the per se approach advocated by scholars
and several courts. The court considered this approach more consistent with the
state's traditional policy of protecting minors from the consequences of immaturity.
B. The Aftermath of Dino
After the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Dino, there was little debate
over the newly created policy. Initially, the supreme court determined that it would
be unfair to apply the decision retroactively to statements taken before the Dino
appointed by the court if he is indigent and charged with an offense punishable by
imprisonment....
18. Dino, 359 So. 2d at 590.
19. Id. (citing State v. Melanson, 259 So. 2d 609 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972)).
20. 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. "1102, 89 S. Ct. 903 (1969). West
created a "totality of circumstances" test based on the similar adult standard. See infra Part HI.B.
21. Dino, 359 So. 2d at 591.
22. Id. at 594.
23. Id. at 593 (citing Commonwealth v. Jamison, 379 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 372 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 343 A.2d 669 (Pa. 1975); Lewis v.
State, 288 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 1972); Freeman v. Wilcox, 167 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. 1969)).
24. Id. at 592-94 (citing Charles L Spencer, Comment, Louisiana's Youth Law: Rules and
Practice, 35 La. L. Rev. 851, 856 (1975); UIA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards
relating to Police Handling of Juvenile Problems § 3.2, at 69-70 (1980); The Council of Judges of the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Rules for Juvenile Courts, Rule 25 (1969); A.
Bruce Ferguson & Alan Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 San Diego L. Rev. 39 (1970)).
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opinion.25 Then, it was faced with defining the meaning of the word "juvenile" as
used in the Dino opinion. The age of majority in Louisiana is eighteen;2 6 however,
the Juvenile Court jurisdiction only extends to children under the age of
seventeen." In State v. Edwards,5 the court noted that, "[t]he age at which a
teenager is by law construed to have or not have the maturity and competence to
knowingly waive his or her constitutional rights is admittedly perhaps an arbitrary
line. No doubt in actuality there are sixteen year olds whose knowledge of and
ability to comprehend their legal rights' surpasses the knowledge of many who are
older but less wise."29 However, the court found that since the age of seventeen
was the "line traditionally drawn for criminal responsibility between the juvenile
and the adult," that should be the cut off age for the Dino requirements.'
Therefore, a parent or an interested adult was not needed to obtain a valid
confession from a seventeen year old suspect.3
The remaining reported cases which cite Dino generally demonstrate that the
requirement was effective. The cases demonstrate that police officers were
following the Dino standard with few difficulties. However, two main issues
remained. First, there was some initial debate as to who would be considered an
"interested adult." The courts had construed this term very broadly, including such
persons as the juvenile's grandparents,32 a sibling age twenty-one,33 and a twenty-
three-year-old brother, who was also a deputy sheriff at the sheriff's station where
the juvenile was being interrogated? 4 In fact, the only reported case where the
court found that the adult did not qualify as an interested adult was State v.
Belton.35 There, thejuvenile was charged with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle
and hit-and-run driving. The police made no effort to contact the child's only
available relative; instead, they asked the child's probation officer to act as a
"concerned adult." The court found that a juvenile probation officer was
inappropriate for the role of "interested adult," questioning whether such person
could "occupy the position of someone not a part of the adversarial system who can
be of impartial guidance to the child in his decision to waive his constitutional
rights. '36 Therefore, the court determined that contacting an attorney would be the
25. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 479 So. 2d 344 (La. 1985); State v. Kent, 391 So. 2d 429 (La.
1981); State v. Haris, 383 So. 2d 1 (La. 1980); State v. Collum, 365 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1978); State v.
Handley, 453 So. 2d 1242 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984), writ denied, 457 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1984).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 29.
27. La. Const. art. V, § 19.
28. 406 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945, 102 S. Ct. 2011 (1982).
29. Id. at 1340.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. In re J.P., 550 So. 2d 942 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
33. State v. Stevenson, 447 So. 2d 1125 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 450 So. 2d 951 (La.
1984).
34. State v. Gachot, 609 So. 2d 269 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
35. 525 So. 2d 77 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
36. Id. at 80.
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only appropriate course of action in a situation where a family member could not
be contacted.37
The second issue left unresolved after Dino was determining the intent of the
court in requiring a "meaningful consultation" between the juvenile and the
interested adult. In State v. Hudson,3" the supreme court was asked to determine
if the circumstances of the case constituted a "meaningful consultation" under the
Dino standard. The sixteen-year-old defendant was arrested and charged with
second-degree murder. Although his parents were present during the reading of the
juvenile's rights and during the interrogation, the only opportunity they were given
to consult with the child about his decision was during a ten minute break before
the taping of the juvenile's confession. In its original opinion, the court simply
stated that, "[tihere is no reasonable doubt about the voluntariness, reliability or the
probative value of the defendant's inculpatory statement."3" Only in a footnote did
the court really address the defendant's concern that he was not given adequate
consultation with his parents, and there the court merely stated that the proper
inquiry was not the nature of the advice given by the parent, but whether the
parent's presence and consultation lead to a "voluntary and reliable statement."
However, on application for rehearing, in a per curiam opinion, the court
reaffirmed its holding in Dino, and noted that, "this case barely passes muster on
the question of whether the juvenile was given an opportunity to engage in a
meaningful consultation with his informed parents. ... " 41
This decision created a split among the circuits as to what was required to
show that the adult and child had the opportunity for a meaningful consultation.
In State v. Francois,42 the first circuit determined that in order to have a "meaning-
ful consultation" under Dino, the interested adult and the juvenile must be given
an opportunity to consult with each other in private before any waiver of the
juvenile's rights. However, the fourth circuit rejected this approach in State v.
Johnson43 stating, "We interpret Dino as requiring an opportunity for a 'meaning-
ful' consultation, be that consultation public or private." Thus, the ten minute
time period that the defendant and his mother were afforded while the officers
prepared to take the defendant's statement was sufficient to show that the two had
an opportunity to consult with each other. The third45 and fifth' circuits followed
the fourth circuits' decision in Johnson and set a precedent of considering any
opportunity for the child to have a discussion with an interested adult sufficient to
meet the Dino requirements.
37. Id.
38. 404 So. 2d 460 (La. 1981).
39. Id. at 464.
40. Id. at 464 n.7.
41. Id. at466.
42. 411 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
43. 508 So. 2d 953 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
44. Id. at 955.
45. State v. Carter, 569 So. 2d 1025 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
46. In re J.P., 550 So. 2d 942 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
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C. Stepping Backwards-The Court's Decision in State v. Fernandez
More than two decades after the Dino decision, the court was again presented
with the issue of ajuvenile's waiver in State v. Fernandez.47 There, the defendant
was a sixteen-year-old male convicted of armed robbery of a teenage girl. The
officer arrived on the scene of the crime, obtained a statement from the victim and
drove around the area with the victim looking for the suspect. Shortly thereafter,
the victim identified the defendant, who was riding his bicycle in the area, as the
suspect. The officer placed the suspect under arrest, advised him of his rights, and
placed him into the car (with the victim). The defendant then made this spontane-
ous statement: "Look, I'm sorry. I want to cooperate with the investigation.""
After Fernandez promised to give the victim back her items, the officer asked
Fernandez to tell him where the weapon and stolen items were located. Fernandez
told the officer where he had hidden the items. The officer then drove with the two
teenagers to the locations and obtained the items. After obtaining the evidence, the'
officer asked the defendant his name and age for the report. For the first time, the
officer discovered the defendant was a juvenile.49
Over the objection of the prosecution, the lower court, basing its ruling on
Dino5" granted the defendant's motion to suppress some of the statements made by
the defendant and the evidence obtained from those statements. The Louisiana
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, in an unpublished opinion, determined that Dino
did not apply to the spontaneous statements made by the defendant; however, since
the officer obtained the remaining statements and the evidence from answers given
in response to an interrogation by the officer, they had to be suppressed under
Dino. Despite the arguments of the state, the court found that the questions asked
of the defendant by the officer were not for clarification, but intended to obtain
information." As such, the officer could not ask these questions until Fernandez
had the benefit of advisement from his parent, counsel or interested adult.
In the majority opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Justice Lemmon first
determined that the officer's questioning was a custodial interrogation that would
have triggered the Dino requirements. The court then considered the continuing
"vitality" of the Dino standard. In its evaluation, the court cited the United States
Supreme Court decision in Fare v. Michael C.,52 which approved the use of a
"totality of circumstances" test in this area. This test required that the courts
inquire into all circumstances surrounding a juvenile interrogation including age,
experience, education, background, intelligence, and ability to understand his
47. 712 So. 2d 485 (La. 1998).
48. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, State v. Fernandez, No. 384-299 (Crim. Dist. Ct. Parish
of Orleans, 9/5/96) at 9.
49. Id. at 11.
50. In fact, when the judge handed down her ruling on the motion, the prosecution noted that he
was not even familiar with the Dino ruling. Id. at 41.
51. Statev. Fernandez, No. 96-K-2142, slip op. at4(La. App. 4thCir. Oct. 23,1996), rev'd,712
So. 2d 485 (La. 1998).
52. 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
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rights. Justice Lemmon then stated that the Louisiana Constitution required no
more than this type of inquiry. He also noted that the Pennsylvania decision that
Dino was modeled after had been overruled to reinstate the totality of circum-
stances test. 3 Although the court recognized the empirical evidence displaying a
failure by juveniles to comprehend the language in standard waiver forms, it agreed
with other courts that the totality of circumstances test would meet the special
needs of juveniles. 4 Finally, Justice Lemmon, in discussing Dino's public policy
grounds, found that in the past twenty years, the state had shifted away from its
policy of extending special treatment to juveniles, and that the only public policy
references cited by the Dino court were legislative, not judicial, decisions. 55
Therefore, the court held the Dino requirements were not constitutionally or
statutorily required and could be overruled.56
Justice Johnson dissented.5 7 She first noted the recent adoption of the
Louisiana Children's Code that recognizes the need for additional protection of
minors. Second, she cited the language of the Dino court finding that juveniles are
not mature enough to understand their rights. Finally, she criticized the majority
for ignoring Louisiana's tradition of providing increased protection for juveniles
from their immaturity, citing rules that protect minors from the evils of gambling,
purchasing alcohol, and using tobacco products.
I. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO JUVENILE WAIVER
A. The Miranda Standard
When the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Miranda v. Arizona,58 it provided
little guidance as to the application of the new standard it had created. Miranda
held that before any person taken into custody could be interrogated, the police
must inform the person of his right to remain silent, that any statement made by him
may be used as evidence against him, that he has a right to an attorney, and that if
he cannot retain an attorney, one will be appointed for him. In order for a waiver
of these rights to be effective, the suspect must make the waiver voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently.9
The Miranda standard was created in a case involving an adult in the judicial
system. Miranda did not mention procedures dealing with juveniles. The Court
referred to the issue of applying Miranda type standards to juveniles the next year
53. State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485,488 (La. 1998) (discussing Commonwealth v. Smith, 372
A.2d 797 (Pa. 1977) (creating the per se approach), overruled by, Commonwealth v. Christmas, 465
A.2d 989 (Pa. 1983), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1984) (adopting the totality
of circumstances approach)).
54. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d at 489.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 490.
58. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
59. Id. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612 (emphasis added).
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in In re Gault,' where it held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applied to juveniles as well as adults. Justice Fortas, writing for the
Court, concluded that ajuvenile and his parents must be informed of the juvenile's
right to counsel at proceedings to determine delinquency, and that if he could not
afford counsel, one would be appointed to represent him.6 The Court also
recognized ajuvenile's privilege against self-incrimination62 and noted, "[S]pecial
problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of
children."63 However, it did not address these special problems, nor did it set forth
any guidelines for lower courts to follow in the future.
B. The Totality of Circumstances Test
Shortly after Gault, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in West
v. United States," adopted a "totality of circumstances" standard to determine
whether a child validly waived his Miranda rights. West was a sixteen-year-old
male who had been found in possession of a stolen vehicle. Relying upon
numerous decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal courts dealing with
waiver of Miranda rights, the court rejected a standard based solely on the age of
the juvenile and articulated guidelines for the totality of circumstances standard.
Under this test, one must look at all of the events surrounding the interrogation of
the juvenile, focusing specifically on nine factors: (1) age of the accused; (2)
education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of
the charge, if any has been filed, and the nature of his right to consult with an
attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or
allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused
was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used
in interrogation; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether the accused refused to
voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has
repudiated an extrajudicial statement at a later date.65 The court found that West
had a tenth grade education and had lived on his own as a working adult for several
months; he was fully informed of his rights, and was interrogated only for a short
period of time after police had filed formal charges. Looking at the totality of
circumstances, the court found that West had voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his right to remain silent.
Several years later, the United States Supreme Court addressed this specific
issue again in Fare v. Michael C." This case involved a sixteen-year-old juvenile
accused of murder in California. The California Supreme Court held that the
juvenile's request to see his probation officer before interrogation was a per se
60. 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. at 1428 (1967).
61. Id. at 42, 87 S. Ct. at 1451.
62. Id. at 55, 87 S. Ct. at 1458.
63. Id.
64. 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102, 89 S. Ct. 903 (1969).
65. id. at 469.
66. 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
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invocation of his right to remain silent and to consult with counsel. In a five-four
decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority,
Justice Blackmun found that a probation officer, not trained in the law, was not in
a position to advise the accused as to his rights. Since the probation officer cannot
act on behalf of the defendant and the communications of the accused to the
probation officer would not be shielded by the lawyer-client privilege, the
probation officer was no substitute for Fifth Amendment counsel.67 Therefore, the
majority held, this request did not per se constitute an invocation of the juvenile's
Fifth Amendment rights.6" Furthermore, Justice Blackmun found the "totality of
circumstances approach.., adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver
even where the interrogation of juveniles is involved."'69 The Court found no
reason to expand the Miranda requirements any further for juveniles than for
adults, stating:
The totality approach permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of
the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence,
and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given
him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of
waiving those rights.7"
This approach, according to Blackmun, allowed the lower courts the flexibility
needed to consider the requests of the child, while refraining from "imposing rigid
restraints on police and courts....,
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented, stating,
"I believe that interrogation ceases whenever a juvenile requests an adult who is
obligated to represent his interests. 72 After reviewing the standard Miranda
created, Justice Marshall discussed the Court's history concerning juveniles in an
interrogation setting, relying on Gallegos v. Colorado.73 In Gallegos, the majority
reasoned that a fourteen-year-old could not "be compared with an adult in full
possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admis-
sions .... A lawyer or adult relative or friend could have given petitioner the
protection which his own immaturity could not."'74 In a separate dissent, Justice
Powell discussed what he considered the majority's inconsistency with the Court's
prior opinion in In re Gault.7" Powell noted that, in Gault, the Court had stated,
"[C]are must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not
67. Id. at 719, 99 S. Ct. at 2569.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 725, 99 S. Ct. at 2572.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 725-26, 99 S. Ct. at 2572.
72. Id. at 729, 99 S. Ct. at 2574.
73. 370 U.S. 49, 82S. Ct. 1209 (1962).
74. Fare, 442 U.S. at 729, 99 S. Ct. at 2574.
75. 384 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
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only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of
ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair. 7
6
The decision by the Supreme Court in Fare v. Michael C.77 led most states to
stand by the totality of circumstances approach.78 It also enticed some states, such
as Georgia and Pennsylvania, to dispense with the stricter per se approaches they
had previously adopted, and return to the more flexible totality approach.79 These
states generally cite the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court's
decision in Fare for the basis of their decision to use the totality approach.8
C. The Per Se Standard
Several states have been dissatisfied with the totality of circumstances
approach in juvenile cases. Since states are free to go beyond the protections of the
United States Constitution and the Court's decision in Fare, many states have
turned away from the totality approach and adopted higher standards of protection
forjuveniles. Recognizing the problems that a high degree of discretion can create
in these cases, and noting that empirical research has shown that juveniles have
difficulty understanding their rights, many courts opted for a more concrete,
simplified per se approach.8' Some state courts and legislatures began mandating
76. Id. at 55, 87 S. Ct. at 1458. References to this decision were noticeably absent from the
majority opinion in Fare.
77. 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
78. Most states have rejected the per se approach and adopted a totality of circumstances test.
See generally Ala. Rule of Juv. P. 11 (1998); Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So. 2d 1006 (Ala. 1985); State
v. J.R.N., 861 P.2d 578 (Alaska 1993); State v. Scholtz, 791 P.2d 1070 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); In re
Bonnie H., 56 Cal. App. 4th 563, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); State v. S.L.W., 465 So.
2d 1231 (Fla. 1985); Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 1976); State v. Doe, 963 P.2d 392 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1998); In re L.L., 693 N.E.2d 908 (111. App. Ct. 1998); State v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373 (Me.
1982); McIntyre v. State, 526 A.2d 30 (Md. 1987); State v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1998); Smith
v. State, 534 So. 2d 194 (Miss. 1988); McGowan v. State, 706 So. 2d 231 (Miss. 1997); In re A.D.R.,
603 S.W.2d 575 (Mo. 1980); Elvik v. State, 965 P.2d 281 (Nev. 1998); State v. Gibson, 718 P.2d 759
(Or. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Lambert, 705 A.2d 957 (R.I. 1997); In re Williams, 217 S.E.2d 719 (S.C.
1975); State v. Caffrey, 332 N.W.2d 269 (S.D. 1983); State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1998);
Grogg v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 549 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); Theriault v. State, 223 N.W.2d 850
(Wis. 1974); Rubio v. State, 939 P.2d 238 (Wyo. 1997).
79. See Freeman v. Wilcox, 167 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. 1969), overruled by, Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d
922 (Ga. 1978), and Commonwealth v. Smith, 372 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1977), overruled by, Commonwealth
v. Christmas, 465 A.2d 989 (Pa. 1983) and Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1984).
80. See In re Bonnie, 56 Cal. App. 4th 563, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); State v.
S.L.W., 465 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1985); Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 1976); State v. Doe, 963 P.2d
392 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998); State v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373 (Me. 1982); McIntyre v. State, 526 A.2d
30 (Md. 1987); State v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1998); In re A.D.R., 603 S.W.2d 575 (Mo.
1980); State v. Lambert, 705 A.2d 957 (R.I. 1997); In re Williams, 217 S.E.2d 719 (S.C. 1975); State
v. Caffrey, 332 N.W.2d 269 (S.D. 1983); State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1998); Grogg v.
Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 549 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); Theriault v. State, 223 N.W.2d 850 (Wis. 1974);
Rubio v. State, 939 P.2d 238 (Wyo. 1997).
81. At least thirteen states have adopted the per se approach. See generally Colo. Rev. Stat. §
19-2-511 (Supp. 1998); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-137 (Supp. 1999); Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1 (1999); Iowa
Code §§ 232.11, 232.45 (1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-331 (1999); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-14
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that a juvenile be provided the opportunity to consult with a parent, guardian,
attorney, or other interested adult before he can waive his Miranda rights and be
questioned by police. This procedural safeguard is designed to reduce the
juvenile's vulnerability and lack of maturity, putting him on more equal footing
with the police officer interrogating him.
1. States Adopting the Per Se Approach Through Jurisprudence
At least thirteen states have now adopted some form of per se approach.82 One
of the leaders of this movement was the Supreme Court of Indiana and its opinion
in Lewis v. State.83 Lewis was a seventeen-year-old convicted of first degree
murder.84 In one of the first opinions adopting aper se approach, the Indiana court
reasoned, "It indeed seems questionable whether any child falling under the legally
defined age of a juvenile and confronted in such a setting can be said to be able to
voluntarily, and willingly waive those most important rights."" After noting the
legal and social differences between adults and juveniles, the Lewis court held that:
a juvenile's statement or confession cannot be used against him at a
subsequent trial or hearing unless both he and his parents or guardian
were informed of his rights to an attorney, and to remain silent. Further-
more, the child must be given an opportunity to consult with his parents,
guardian, or an attorney representing the juvenile as to whether or not he
wishes to waive those rights. 6
Following the Lewis structure, several state courts have created a per se
approach to the juvenile waiver standard. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia adopted the test in State v. Taylor,87 which involved three juveniles of
various ages. Citing the Lewis court, the West Virginia court noted that there was
an "unrebuttable presumption, long memorialized by courts and legislatures, that
juveniles lack the capacity to make legally binding decisions."88 Writing for a
(Michie 1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-595 (1995); Okla. Stat. tit.10, § 7303-3.1 (1998); Tex. Faro. Code
Ann. §§ 51.09-51.10 (West Supp. 1999); W. Va. Code § 49-5-2(1) (1998); People v. S.M.D., 864 P.2d
1103 (Colo. 1994); In re Doe, No. 17795, 1998 WL207202 (Haw. Ct. App. April 29, 1998); Lewis v.
State, 288 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 1972); State v. Walker, 352 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1984); Commonwealth v.
A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654 (Ma. 1983); In re ETC, 449 A.2d 937 (Vt. 1982).
82. See sources cited supra note 81.
83. 288 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 1972). This holding was latercodifiedatInd. Code § 31-32-5-1(1999).
84. The police picked Lewis up at his home. They refused to inform him of the charges until they
arrived at the police station. At that time, they told him they were investigating a stolen vehicle. Only
after Lewis waived his rights did the police inform him they were investigating the injuries to the
victim. They did not inform Lewis that the victim had died until after the statement was taken. Id. at
139.
85. Id. at 141.
86. Id. at 142.
87. 276 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1981).
88. Id. at 203.
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unanimous court, the Chief Justice found that under the West Virginia statute, a
juvenile could not waive his right to counsel before consulting with an attorney. 9
In In re ETC,' the Vermont Supreme Court instituted a per se rule based on
the state constitution. ETC was a fourteen-year-old male convicted of breaking
into two condominiums. At the time of the arrest, the boy was residing in a state
juvenile home. The police only contacted the director of the home. Recognizing
the "inability of a juvenile to choose... among courses of legal actions," the court
set forth three requirements for a valid juvenile waiver: (1) he must be allowed to
consult with an adult; (2) the adult must be interested in the general welfare of the
child, and not associated with the prosecution; and (3) the adult must be informed
of the rights of the juvenile.9 '
New Jersey also has a judicially created per se standard. In In re J.F.,92 the
New Jersey Superior Court held that police may not interrogate a juvenile without
the presence of his parent or guardian unless: (1) the juvenile withholds the
name(s) and address(es) of the parent or guardian; (2) a good faith effort to locate
them has been made and is unsuccessful; and (3) the parent(s) or guardian refuses
to attend the interrogation.93
Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court's statement to the contrary, this "trend
towards an interested adult standard"94 has actually continued. At the same time
the Louisiana Supreme Court struck down the Dino standard, a court in Hawaii was
adopting the rule for the first time in In re Doe.95 The Hawaii Intermediate Court
of Appeals discussed the various approaches to this problem by reviewing the most
cited cases on the issue. The court reviewed the decision in Fare, and noted that
the majority of states use the totality approach; however, the Hawaii court found
that, under its statute requiring immediate parental notification, a logical
interpretation of the statute required police to prohibit custodial interrogation of the
child until a parent, guardian, or legal custodian had been given a reasonable
opportunity to communicate with the child.9"
Other jurisdictions have interpreted existing parental notification statutes to
require some effort on the part of police to allow for parental consultation before
the court will allow a waiver to be valid. In New York, the court in People v.
Castro97 found that a New York statute requiring immediate parental notification
89. Id. at 203-04 (citing W. Va. Code § 49-5-8(d) and § 49-5-9(a)(2)).
90. 449 A.2d 937 (Vt. 1982).
91. Id. at 939-40.
92. 668 A.2d 426 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
93. Id. at 430.
94. State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 488 (La. 1998).
95. 981 P.2d 704 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd by, 978 P.2d 684 (Haw. 1999).
96. Id. at 714. This case was overruled by the Hawaii Supreme Court subsequent to the
completion of this case note. See In re Doe, 978 P.2d 684 (Haw. 1999). In its decision, the court
determined that the plain language of the Hawaii statute merely required notification to the parents that
their child was in custody. After noting that the Louisiana Supreme Court had recently overruled the
Dino standard in Fernandez, the Court reversed the adoption of the per se standard and returned to the
use of a totality of circumstances test.
97. 462 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
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upon taking a child into custody meant that police must use all reasonable efforts
to notify parents and await their arrival before conducting any interrogation of the
child. If this is not done, the court will automatically exclude the statement of the
child.98 In State v. Ellvanger,9 the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed its
statute requiring that a child not represented by his parent or guardian must be
represented by an attorney at all stages of "custodial proceedings" and determined
that the word "proceedings" including investigational interrogations."° The court
then held that the police have a mandatory duty to provide a child who is not
represented by his parent or guardian with an attorney, and the child may not waive
this right.' °'
2. States Adopting The Per Se Approach Through Legislation
Shortly after the Indiana Supreme Court issued the Lewis opinion, the Indiana
legislature adopted the court's decision and passed a more stringent per se statute
requiring that rights of a juvenile may be waived only by the child's counsel,
parent, guardian, custodian or guardian ad litem. " In order for a parent, guardian,
custodian, or guardian ad litem to validly effect such waiver, it must be shown that:
(1) the waiver was knowing and voluntary; (2) that person has no interest adverse
to the child; (3) meaningful consultation has occurred between the person and the
child; and (4) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins the waiver.0 3
Other states have also adopted similar statutes. Texas has adopted a statute
which prohibits a child from waiving his rights in ajuvenile proceeding without the
consent of an attorney."° Oklahoma requires that no custodial interrogation
commence until the child and the "parents, guardian, attorney, adult relative, adult
caretaker, or legal custodian of the child have been fully advised of the constitu-
tional and legal rights of the child."'"' 3 Connecticut's per se rule states that any
"admission, confession or statement, written or oral, made by a child to a police
officer ... shall be inadmissible in any proceeding," unless it was made in the
presence of the child's parent or guardian and after both the child and the adult
have been advised of the child's rights."
Recognizing the need for increased protection of juveniles, the United States
Congress adopted a per se rule to be applied to juveniles taken into custody for
alleged acts ofjuvenile delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.'°7
This statute provides that, "Whenever ajuvenile is taken into custody for an alleged
98. Id. at 380 (citing N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 305.2 (McKinney 1999)).
99. 453 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1990).
100. Id. at 813 (citing N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-26 (Supp. 1999)).
101. Id.
102. Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1 (1999).
103. Id.
104. Tex. Farn. Code Ann. § 51.09 (West Supp. 1999).
105. Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7303-3.1 (1998).
106. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-137 (Supp. 1999).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1985).
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act of juvenile delinquency, the arresting officer shall immediately advise such
juvenile of his legal rights, in a language comprehensible to a juvenile ... [and]
shall also notify the parents, guardian, or custodian of the rights of the juve-
nile... ."108 In United States v. Nash,"° a federal district court held that notifica-
tion of parent, guardian, or custodian after a statement had been taken from a
juvenile did not satisfy the requirements of the Act. The statute requires
notification of the adult prior to the waiver of rights by the juvenile."'
D. The "Rule of Fourteen'"-A Variation of the Per Se Standard
Some states that have been wary of adopting a per se approach for older and
more experienced juveniles have turned to a lower, age-based per se rule.
Massachusetts was one of the first states to adopt this type of rule in Common-
wealth v. A Juvenile."' Here, the court reversed the convictions of two juveniles,
ages twelve and thirteen, for breaking and entering. The unanimous court reviewed
the studies done by Thomas Grisso"2 and Ferguson and Douglas" 3 which
suggested that most juveniles do not understand their rights when given standard
warnings. This, along with decisions from other states and legislatures, led the
court to find that it needed a per se approach in order to "prevent the warnings
from becoming merely a ritualistic recitation wherein the effect of actual
comprehension by the juvenile is ignored."" 4 The court then held that, for the
Commonwealth to demonstrate a juvenile had effected a valid waiver, it should
show that the juvenile had the opportunity for meaningful consultation with a
parent or interested adult; moreover, in cases of children under the age of fourteen,
"no waiver can be effective without this added protection.'. For juveniles
fourteen and over, a totality approach would be used, with great weight placed
upon whether the police gave the child an opportunity to consult with an adult prior
to interrogation." 6
This "Rule of Fourteen" prompted several other states to enact similar
standards by statute. North Carolina's legislature established a "Rule of Fourteen"
in its juvenile statutes that provides no admission or confession resulting from an
interrogation of a child less than fourteen years of age may be admitted into
evidence unless it was made in the presence of the child's parent, guardian,
custodian, or attorney."' West Virginia's statute provides that for children less
108. Id.
109. 620 F. Supp. 1439 (S.D. N.Y. 1985).
110. Id. at 1443.
111. 449 N.E.2d 654 (Ma. 1983).
112. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 68
Cal. L Rev. 1134, 1160-61 (1980).
113. Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 24.
114. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 656.
115. Id. at 657.
116. The court held that the circumstances should "demonstrate a high degree of intelligence,
experience, knowledge, or sophistication on the part of the juvenile." Id.
117. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-595 (1995).
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than fourteen, a waiver may only be made with the consent of an attorney. For all
other juveniles, waiver may be effected by the juvenile with consent of either a
parent or an attorney."' Montana has also adopted a requirement that children
under sixteen must seek the advise of their parent or guardian before waiving their
rights. If the child and the parent or guardian cannot agree, the child may only
waive his rights after consultation with counsel." 9 While not adopting a normal
per se approach, New Mexico's legislature went even further than some states,
promulgating a rule that prohibits admission of statements made by children under
thirteen in any circumstances."n In each of these states, the totality approach is
used in cases of juveniles over the per se age.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Kansas created a "Rule of Fourteen"
standard in In re B.M.B. 2 ' B.M.B. was a ten-year-old male who was accused of
raping a four-year-old girl. The interrogating officer questioned the child for more
than half an hour without the child ever talking to his mother. The trial judge stated
in his denial of the motion to suppress the statements from the interrogation that his
decision was based on the length of the interrogation (approximately half an hour)
and the fact that the child only cried on the way to the police station, and while at
the station stated that he would do his homework, "rather than being described as
tearful or overwrought."' 2 The judge also stated, "I know nothing about [the
child's] maturity, other than he obviously can write and has signed the document
... [and has] dated it appropriately."'" Despite his admitted lack of personal
knowledge of the child, the judge disregarded the opinion of experts who testified
that this interrogation was "at best, incompetent; at [worst] reprehensible," and
admitted the statement."
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Supreme Court of Kansas
reaffirmed the use of the totality of circumstances test in the state; however, they
limited its application to juveniles more than fourteen years of age. For children
less than fourteen, the parents, guardian or attorney of the child must be given an
opportunity to consult with the juvenile before he or she may waive his or her
constitutional and legal rights. In making this decision, the court cited the
Massachusetts decision in A Juvenile and several of the state statutes discussed
above. It also noted the purpose of the Juvenile Offender's Code was to have the
state act as "parens patriae for the best interest and welfare of the child."'"
Finally, the court noted that this decision was consistent with the state's commit-
118. W. Va. Code § 49-5-2(l) (1998) (in West Virginia, ajuvenile is a child age sixteen and under.
Therefore, persons seventeen and older may effectively waive their rights without any consultation).
119. Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-331 (1999).
120. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-14 (Michie 1999).
121. 955 P.2d 1302 (Kan. 1998).
122. Id. at 1306.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1305.
125. Id. at 1312.
2000]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ment to the rehabilitation of juveniles and the law providing that juveniles under
fourteen may not be prosecuted as adults. 26
E. The Juvenile Waiver Form Approach
Rejecting all of the above standards, the New Hampshire court created a
different approach which it set forth in State v. Benoit.'" In that case, the court
recognized the findings of empirical studies which determined that juveniles have
difficulty understanding standard waiver forms. In response, it created a
"Simplified Juvenile Rights Form" which police officers must use when dealing
with juveniles less than seventeen years of age. The form sets forth the rights of
the child in simplified, explanatory language. 2 The police must read the form
aloud to the child, and then the child must read the form himself before he may sign
126. Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-1636 (Supp. 1997).
127. 490 A.2d 295 (N.H. 1985).
128. Id. at 306-07. The form reads in part:
Before I am allowed to ask you any questions, you must understand that you have certain
tights, or protections, that have been given to you by law. These rights make sure that you
will be treated fairly. You will not be punished for deciding to use these rights. I will read
your rights and explain them to you. You may ask questions as we go along so that you can
fully understand what your rights are. Do you understand me so far? Yes __ No -,
1. You have the right to remain silent. This means that you do not have to say or write
anything. You do not have to talk to anyone or answer any questions we ask you. You will
not be punished for deciding not to talk to us. Do you understand this right? Yes - No
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court. This means that if you do
say or write anything, what you say or write will be used in a court to prove that you may
have broken the law. Do you understand this? Yes __ No __
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before any questioning. You have the right to have
the lawyer with you while you are being questioned. The lawyer will help you decide what
you should do or say. The things you say to the lawyer cannot be used in court to prove that
you may have broken the law. If you decide you want a lawyer, we will not question you
until you have been allowed to talk to the lawyer. Do you understand this right? Yes __
No__
4. If you want to talk to a lawyer and you cannot afford one, we will get you a lawyer at no
cost to you before any questioning begins. This means that if you want a lawyer and you
cannot pay for one, you still may have one. Do you understand this right? Yes __ No _.
5. You can refuse to answer any or all questions at any time. You also can ask to have a
lawyer with you at any time. This means that if you decide, at any time during questioning,
that you do not want to talk, you may tell us to stop and you cannot be asked any more
questions. Also, if you decide you would like to talk to a lawyer at any time during
questioning, you will not be asked any more questions until a lawyer is with you. Do you
understand this right? Yes - No __.
6. (In felony cases only) There is a possibility that you'may not be brought to juvenile court
but instead will be treated as an adult in criminal court. There you could go to a county jail
or the State prison. If you are treated as an adult you will have to go through the adult
criminal system, just as if you were 18 years old. If that happens, you will not receive the
protections of the juvenile justice system. Do you understand this? Yes __ No __.
7. Do you have any questions so far? Yes __ No __.
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it. A second form must be read and signed if the child agrees to waive his rights.'"
Unfortunately, failure by the police to use the form is only a rebuttable presumption
of inadequacy, not aperse invalidation of the waiver.'" However, the court noted
that, in reality, it would be unlikely that circumstances would arise to justify the
failure of police to use the waiver form. Many commentators have suggested the
use of such specialized waiver forms, 3 ' claiming that such forms could raise the
understanding of younger juveniles, obviating the need to have police tailor their
presentation to juveniles of different ages and mental abilities. However, no form
would be able to assist every child; nor would such a form "diminish the potentially
intimidating nature of a police interrogation."'32
IV. PROBLEMS WrrH THE TOTALrrY OF CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH
Despite the widespread use of the totality of circumstances standard, it remains
problematic. Many legislatures, courts and commentators have rejected the
approach because they do not believe a juvenile has the mental capacity to waive
his Miranda rights without any outside assistance.' In his seminal work,
Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An EmpiricalAnalysis,"4 Thomas
Grisso surveyed more than four hundred juveniles, including previous offenders
and non-offenders, and compared their understanding of standard Miranda rights
to that of a group of adults. Grisso's first test evaluated the group's understanding
of each of the four separate warnings in a standard waiver of rights form by asking
129. id. at 307. This form reads in part:
I can read and understand English. Yes - No _. I have been read and I have read my
rights as listed above. I fully understand what my rights are. I have been asked if I have any
questions and I do not have any. I am willing to give up my right to silence and answer
questions. I give up my right to have a lawyer present. I do not wish to speak to a lawyer
before I answer any questions. No promises or threats or offers of deals have been made to
me to make me give up my rights. I understand that I may change my mind at any time and
say that I want my rights if I choose. However, if I change my mind, it will not affect what
I have already done or said.
130. Id. at 304.
131. See Ferguson& Douglas, supra note 24; Grisso, supra note 112; and LarryE. Holtz, Miranda
in a Juvenile Setting: A Child's Right to Silence, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 534, 549 (1987).
132. Benoit, 490 A.2d at 307.
133. See supra Part m.D-E.
134. Grisso, supra note 112. Grisso's study consisted of several different tests. The first involved
the subject's understanding of the four Miranda warning statements. For example, the subject was
provided with the statement, "You do not have to make a statement and have the right to remain silent."
The subject then paraphrased the statement into his own words to show his understanding of the
meaning of the statement. Because of the varied nature of the responses, a panel of psychologists and
lawyers was formed to group the responses into three categories for scoring. The second test involved
a vocabulary test where the subjects were asked to define six specific words from the warnings: consult,
attorney, interrogation, appoint, entitled, and right. The third test was a true-false test where the subject
was showed two cards, first the correct Miranda warning, and then a paraphrased version. The subject
was then required to identify by stating true or false whether or not the paraphrased version meant the
same thing as the original warning. For a more detailed explanation of the testing process, see Grisso,
supra note 112, at 1144-47.
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the subjects to define the rights in their own language. The results determined that
55.3% of the juveniles surveyed failed to understand at least one of their Miranda
rights.' Only 20.9% ofjuveniles under fifteen understood all four of the warnings
provided in a standard Miranda waiver, compared with 42.3% of adults
surveyed. 36 Most importantly, only 29.3% of the juveniles understood their right
to consult with an attorney and have him present at interrogation. 3 7 Grisso also
tested the juveniles' understanding of the function and significance of their
Miranda rights. This section of the survey reached several notable conclusions:
* 28.6% of the juveniles believed the police were friendly or apologetic;
* 28% assumed lawyers owed a duty to the court which took precedence
over the attorney-client privilege;
* 61.8% believed ajudge could penalize ajuvenile for invoking his right
to silence; and,
- 55.3% thought they would be required to explain their criminal
involvement in court if questioned by ajudge, despite their right to remain
silent. '
Grisso analyzed all options for evaluating ajuvenile's waiver and determined
that the best protection forjuveniles would be provided when counsel consults with
the juvenile before the waiver. 39 After conducting similar studies, the President's
Crime Commission,"4 the Institute of Judicial Administration, and American Bar
Association Juvenile Justice Standards Project 4' agreed and promulgated
recommendations that would make a child's right to counsel at all stages of the
juvenile justice process non-waivable.
Similar surveys done by other scholars in this area also conclude thatjuveniles,
especially those under fifteen, and particularly learning disable juveniles, do not
have the capacity to understand their Miranda rights. 42 One study, cited in the
135. Id. at 1153-54.
136. Id. at 1153
137. Id. at 1152. The results of survey showed that 8.8% of juveniles did not understand their
right to remain silent; 23.9% did not understand that what they said could be used against them in court;
44.8% did not understand their right to consult with an attorney; and 4.9% did not understand their
right to have an attorney provided for them. Lack of understanding was shown by obtaining zero points
for their responses to being questioned about the meaning of the right. An adequate response received
two points.
138. Id. at 1157-59.
139. Id. at 1161-62.
140. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,38, 87 S. Ct. 1428,1449 n.65 (1967) (citing the National Crime
Commission Report at 86-87).
141. See Standards Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings, Standard 5.1, pp. 89-94 (1980).
142. See also Robert E. Shepherd Jr. & Barbara A. Zaremba, Juvenile Justice: When a Disabled
Juvenile Confesses to a Crime: Should it be Admissible?, ABA Criminal Justice, Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter
1995, at 31-35 (citing Barbara A. Zaremba, Comprehension of Miranda Rights by 14-18 Year Old
African-American and Caucasian Males With and Without Learning Disabilities, Ed.D. Diss., School
of Education, College of William & Mary, 1992); Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 24 (this study was
cited in Dino, finding that 81 of 86juveniles who had waived their Miranda rights "did not consciously
and fully understand their rights."); Sam Manoogian, Factors Affecting Juveniles' Comprehension of
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Brief for the Respondent in Fernandez, found that: (1) only one of the 115
juveniles studied understood the concept of a right; (2) only one of the juveniles
could correctly identify what a lawyer is and what he does; (3) the majority of
juveniles believed that evoking their right to counsel would only entitle them to a
lawyer in court; (4) a majority thought that the statement "anything you say can and
will be used against you in a court" meant that any disrespectful words to the police
would be reported to the judge; (5) a majority of learning disabled juveniles
believed that the right to remain silent only meant that they did not have to say
anything without being directly asked; and (6) although the majority of learning
disabled juveniles replied "yes" when asked whether or not they understood their
rights, results showed that only a few of them actually understood.143 Without such
understanding, it seems impossible for any court to determine that a juvenile has
"voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" waived his rights.
Another serious problem with the totality of circumstances approach is the
unfettered discretion of the courts. Even the United States Supreme Court
recognized in In re Gault that "unbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."'" The
totality approach gives judges the latitude to admit all but the most extremely
coerced confessions by juveniles. As discussed above, many researchers found
that children under most circumstances cannot understand their rights when
presented with them. Nevertheless, judges allow most confessions by juveniles
into court.
45
These cases could be the result of many factors. First, these decisions may be
the result of increasing pressure from the public to "crack down" on juvenile
Miranda Rights Statements, Ph.D. Diss., St. Louis Univ., 1978.
143. Shepherd & Zaremba, supra note 142, at 34, quoted in Supplemental Reply Brief for
Defendant-Respondent at 13, State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485 (La. 1998) (No. 96-KK-2719).
144. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18, 87 S. Ct. at 1439.
145. See, e.g., Paxton v. Jarvis, 735 F.2d 1306 (11 th Cir. 1984) (confession of fifteen year old was
valid after questioning from 8:30 P.M. to 4:30 A.M. without food, despite inconsistencies and evidence
of police yelling accusations and racial slurs at the juvenile); Vance v. Bordenkircher, 692 F.2d 978 (4th
Cir. 1982) (fifteen year old with mental age of nine and below normal IQ of 62 can effectuate valid
waiver without consultation); Cotton v. U.S., 446 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1971) (court found juvenile
understood his rights despite showing that the fifteen year old had only attended school for four years,
entering first grade at the age often, and that he was unable to spell the word "true" on the waiver form
and in court even after being told how by the judge); McDonald v. Black, 661 F. Supp. 660 (D. Neb.
1986) (waiver valid for two of three confessions; invalid confession obtained while sixteen year old
defendant was sobbing, incoherent, and complaining of chest pains; second, valid confession was given
shortly afterjuvenile was treated in the hospital for acute anxiety; third was given the next morning; all
three statements were inconsistent); Parker v. State, 351 So. 2d 927 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) (confession
valid despite fifteen year old with fifth grade reading level being confronted by two police officers who
consistently accused him of lying and told him that he would "feel better if he told us the truth and
asked for forgiveness"); State v. Jackson, 576 P.2d 129 (Ariz. 1978) (confession valid despite presence
of coercive factors); People v. Hester, 237 N.E.2d 466 (Ill. 1968) (confession of a fourteen year old with
IQ of 82 was valid); Commonwealth v. Darden, 271 A.2d 257 (Pa. 1970) (confession was found
voluntary despite borderline mental retardation of fifteen year old juvenile questioned without parental
or attorney consultation).
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crime.'" Without stringent guidelines to follow, elected judges might be less
willing to throw out a confession by a child in a serious crime. The totality
approach lacks a clear and definite measure against which a court can determine
whether a juvenile confession is voluntary. As shown by frequent dissents in
totality approach cases, varying interpretations of the same facts can lead to
different conclusions of law. 47 At least one commentator believes that such
inconsistent applications "can be attributed to the lack of any criteria indicating the
weight a court should give to the various circumstances surrounding a custodial
interrogation."' 48 In fact, the court in Fernandez did not even specify which factors
the lower courts should consider when deciding the totality of circumstances,
leaving the courts with virtually no guidance.'49
More importantly, a determination of voluntariness by a trial court judge
should be considered a finding of fact, which an appellate court should not disturb
unless it is unsupported by the evidence.' This stringent standard of review could
be very difficult to meet by a juvenile appealing an adverse ruling on a motion to
suppress.' 5 ' Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in State v. David
5"2
that "It]he State has a burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession beyond
a reasonable doubt at a hearing on a Motion to Suppress,"'' under a totality of
circumstances approach, the juvenile must affirmatively prove he either did not
understand the warnings administered to him, or did not have the capacity to waive
his rights knowingly and intelligently. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that
a court determining the admissibility of a juvenile's confession must not only
consider whether the juvenile was aware of his rights, "but also of the conse-
quences of foregoing them,... knew he was faced with a phase of the adversary
system, and ... was aware that he was not in the presence of persons acting solely
in his interest."' 54 Many judges may not be aware of the research dealing with this
subject and, thus, cannot consider it when making a ruling on a motion to suppress;
146. See Sam V. Meddis, Poll: Treat Juveniles the Same as Adult Offenders, USA Today, Oct.
29, 1993, at Al; and Rorie Sherman, Juvenile Judges Say: Time to Get Tough, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 8,
1994, at Al.
147. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979); Vance v. Bordenkircher,
692 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Palmer, 604 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1979); State v. Fernandez, 712
So. 2d 485 (La. 1998); McIntyre v. State, 526 A.2d 30 (Md. 1987); In re A.D.R., 603 S.W.2d 575 (Mo.
1980) Commonwealth v. Barry, 454 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1982); State v. Janis, 356 N.W.2d 916 (S.D. 1984);
State v. Ives, 648 A.2d 129 (Vt. 1994).
148. Lawrence Schlam, Police Interrogation of Children and State Constitutions: Why Not
Videotape the MTV Generation?, 26 U. Tol. L Rev. 901,913 (1995).
149. The court mentioned in a footnote an "illustrative list of factors" from West which were cited
(and rejected) in Dino, but these were not in the body of the opinion, nor were they suggested to be
binding on future courts. State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 489 n.5 (La. 1998).
150. State v. Taylor, 422 So. 2d 109 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103, 103 S. Ct. 1803
(1983).
151. See State v. Carter, 664 So. 2d 367 (La. 1995).
152. 425 So. 2d 1241 (La. 1983).
153. Id. at 1245.
154. State v. Kent, 371 So. 2d 1319,1320 (La. 1979) (citing In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 591 (La.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047, 99 S. Ct. 722 (1978)).
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this is especially true in Louisiana where we have had a per se approach for more
than two decades, thus making the need for such information minimal. Therefore,
the juvenile must often make the court aware of this information himself, and then
prove that he, as an individual, did not understand his rights or the consequences
of waiving them.'
Furthermore, the lack of specific judicial guidelines has an adverse effect not
only on judicial efficiency, but also on police economy. Without some concrete
guidelines, police officers have no assurance the statements they obtain in an
interrogation will be admissible in a courtroom. The officers do not know at the
time of the interrogation which judge will eventually preside in the case, or what
factors that particular judge will place more emphasis on when issuing a ruling in
a motion to suppress. This makes it "practically impossible" for an officer taking
a statement from a juvenile to determine what actions he needs to take in order to
assure the statement will be admissible at trial." 6
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE PER SE APPROACH
Many courts have rejected the per se approach, criticizing the standard for
several reasons. Almost all advocates of the totality approach criticize the failure
of per se rules to sufficiently accommodate the interests of society and justice. 7
As some scholars have noted, the per se approach may not address the interest of
society in preventing a guilty offender from being released on a technicality.'
Many courts have determined that the per se approach is unnecessary, finding that
the totality approach is sufficient to weigh all of the interests involved. In Quick
v. State,"9 the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the use of the per se approach
stating, "The mere fact that a person is under the age of majority does not
automatically render him incapable of making a knowing and voluntary waiver.
The surrounding circumstances must be considered in each case to determine
whether a particular juvenile had sufficient knowledge and maturity to make a
reasoned decision."' "6 In affirming its use of the totality approach, the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court emphasized, "The framework provided by the totality of
the circumstances test is sufficiently flexible so as to accommodate the interests of
155. For example, in State v. Fernandez, the Supplemental Brief for the State, dealing with the
issue of overruling Dino was only eleven pages long, and referenced almost exclusively to the decision
of Fare. The Supplemental Brief for the Defendant-Respondent, however, contained thirty-six pages
of text, and was 118 pages with the appendices containing research by scholars and commentators. The
defendant was required to present the court with all of the empirical evidence supporting his position.
However, the court made no mention of this evidence in its opinion.
156. See Schlam, supra note 148, at 914. See also Elizabeth Maykut, Who is Advising Our
Children: Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles in Florida, 21 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1345, 1355 (1994).
157. See State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485,489 (La. 1998).
158. See Anthony J. Krastek, Comment, The Judicial Response to Juvenile Confessions: An
Examination of the Per Se Rule, 17 Duq. L. Rev. 659, 684 (1979).
159. 599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979).
160. Id. at719.
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both the juvenile and the State."'' Furthermore, courts adopting the totality
approach have rejected aper se approach as being too overprotective of juveniles.
In reversing its decision to adopt a per se approach, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania noted the "lack of wisdom in [the per se approach] which is overly
paternalistic, unnecessarily protective and sacrifices too much of the interests of
justice."'6
Second, some critics argue that aper se rule actually increases uncertainty and
speculation in determining whether a waiver is valid under certain circumstances.
Some commentators believe the presence of an adult may not always be in the best
interest of the child.63 For example, in Anglin v. State,'" a Florida court found that
a juvenile's confession was valid despite the fact that the mother told the child to
confess or she would "clobber him."'65 Parents who do not understand the
seriousness of the charges might encourage a child to tell the truth to the officers
about the incident.' 6" A leading scholar on Youth Rights, Lawrence Schlam, has
noted that there are several potential problems with involving a parents at the
interrogation of his or her child, including: having children make up stories to the
parents; creating a conflict of interest if the parent is eventually called to testify
against the child involving factual issues such as the child's alibi; or even parental
embarrassment which leads to excess parental influence on the child to confess. 67
One commentator found that, "[p]arents, possibly ashamed and/or angered that
their child is in custody, may further coerce the child into owning up to the alleged
offense, instead of affording the youth shelter."'"" Also, there could be a case
where the parent'or interested adult's involvement in the crime may make this
person biased. In some instances, the parent either refuses to participate 69 or
worse, as in Daniels v. State,7 ° arrives at the police station highly intoxicated and
unable to assist the child. Moreover, studies such as Grisso's demonstrate that
many adults do not sufficiently understand their own rights, leading to the
inevitable conclusion that somhe parents will not understand the rights of their
children.'' Also, as discussed above, some courts have had difficulty determining
161. State v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373, 377 (Me. 1982).
162. Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Pa. 1984).
163. See Schlam, supra note 148, at 920.
164. 259 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
165. Id. at 752.
166. Id. See also Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590 (Ind. 1991); In re J.D.Z., 431 N.W.2d 272
(N.D. 1988); Schlam, supra note 148, at 920 n.154.
167. Lawrence Schlam, Police Interrogation and the "Seif"-Incrimination of Children by
Parents: A Problem Not Yet Solved, 6 Clearinghouse Rev. 618, 620 (1973).
168. Comment, Juvenile Confessions: Whether State Procedures Ensure Constitutionally
Permissible Confessions, 67 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 195, 205 (1976).
169. See Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 369 A.2d 1285 (Pa. 1977) and Commonwealth v. Smith, 372
A.2d 797 (Pa. 1977). See also Krastek, supra note 158, and Schlam, supra note 148.
170. 174 S.E.2d 422 (Ga. 1970).
171. See Grisso, supra note 112.
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what is actually required by a "meaningful consultation" and who qualifies as an
"interested adult.'
1 2
Finally, some critics believe the per se approaches are unconstitutional.'
They base this belief on the idea that constitutional rights are considered personal
to the individual accused.7 However, most per se rules require the waiver to be
effected by a third person: the attorney or interested adult, after consultation and
agreement with the juvenile. The child himself cannot waive the right, which critics
believe is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
VI. A RESPONSE TOTHE CRITICS OF THE PER SE APPROACH
The criticism that per se approaches are inflexible, prophylactic rules which
do not effectively allow judges to consider the interest of society ignores the fact
that the rule (Miranda) upon which these standards are based is itself a prophylac-
tic rule which allows a guilty offender to go free if the police have not followed the
"technicalities" of the rule. The Supreme Court based its ruling in Miranda on the
concept that the interests in preserving a person's basic constitutional rights
outweighed the interest of society in not allowing a guilty defendant to go free."7
The per se approaches seem more consistent with the concept of preserving the
basic rights of a child who may be confused and scared when presented with a
custodial interrogation. It guarantees that the child will be afforded the opportunity
to consult with an adult interested in the best welfare of the child before the child
makes a decision that could adversely affect the rest of his future.
There have been instances where the adult who is consulted places more
pressure on the child to confess than the police would have done.' However,
these cases are rare, and if the courts follow the totality approach, we are often
faced with a child who is likely not to have the capacity to waive his rights being
left on his own to do so. States such as Indiana solve this problem by requiring, if
the consultation is with a parent or interested adult, that the adult has "no interest
adverse to the child.""' Therefore, under a strict construction of the statute, if a
conflict of interest exists, the interrogation cannot proceed until a qualifying adult
is found to participate in the waiver. Montana's statute requires that if the parent
and the child cannot agree upon the waiver decision, that decision can then only be
172. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
173. See Krastek, supra note 158 and Schlam, supra note 148.
174. Krastek, supra note 158, at681.
175. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-81, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630-31 (1966). The Court
rejected the argument that society's need for interrogation outweighs the privilege, holding that the
Miranda standards would not unduly interfere with police investigations.
176. See In re J.D.Z., 431 N.W.2d 272 (N.D. 1988) (Officer informed ten-year-old child of his
right to remain silent at which point the child's stepfather stated that the child "will answer [the
officer's] questions and [the child] will tell the truth because [the stepfather] wanted to get to the bottom
of this." After that point the stepfather began to interrogate the child until he made several
incriminating statements.).
177. Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1(2)(b) (1999).
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made after the child consults with an attorney.17 A similar provision in any per se
statute would provide the same type of protection.
The final criticism, that such third party waivers are unconstitutional has not
been accepted by most courts. The United States Supreme Court has itself
recognized this type of third party waiver in Thompson v. Oklahoma:'79
The law must often adjust the manner in which it affords rights to those
whose status renders them unable to exercise choice freely and rationally.
Children... all retain rights to be sure, but often such rights are only
meaningful as they are exercised by agents acting with the best interests
of their principal in mind.... [W]e assume that they do not yet act as
adults do, and thus we act in their interest by restricting certain choices
that we feel they are not yet ready to make with the full benefit of the
costs and benefits attending such decisions.8
It is not only constitutional for Louisiana to allow third party waivers, it would
be inconsistent for the state not to allow this. Many Louisiana code articles and
statutes deny minors the capacity to assert the same rights as adults. '' In fact, there
are few, if any, binding decisions a child can make without consultation with and
approval of an adult. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 683 and 732 state
that an unemancipated minor does not have the capacity to sue or be sued. 8 2 These
articles provide that a representative brings the minor's action on his behalf,
generally a parent or guardian. It seems ironic that a child cannot assert his right
to sue for damages when the police violate his rights, but he can be found to have
the capacity to waive these rights when requested to do so by the police. A female
minor cannot assert her right to obtain an abortion without parental consent or a
court order, 83 nor can she consent to a private adoption of her child.'8  A minor
may not enter into marriage without parental consent.'85 Most significantly, a
minor has no capacity to contract under Louisiana Civil Code article 1918.86 This
means that the child cannot assert his right to buy, sell, donate or improve his
property without the action of his parent, guardian or the court. These are just a
few examples of instances where the state has determined that minors are not
mature enough to assert their own rights.
The perse approach may have critics, but it solves most of the problems found
in the totality of circumstances test. Besides ensuring a child receives some adult
consultation, the per se approach removes police discretion and provides
178. Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-331 (1999).
179. 487 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
180. l& at 825, 108 S. Ct. at 2693 n.23.
181. See infra notes 198-210 and accompanying text for discussion on limitations of minors rights
in Louisiana statutes and codifications.
182. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 683 and 732.
183. La. R.S. 40:1299.35.5 (Supp. 1999).
184. La. Ch.C. art. 1113 (minor must have parental consent or court approval to surrender a child
to anyone other than an agency).
185. La. Civ. Code art. 2333.
186. La. Civ. Codeart. 1918.
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predictability. It could also increase parental involvement in the procedures their
children are facing. The per se rule increases judicial economy while protecting
our children from undue influence. It is not too great a burden on a police
department, since they have been doing it for twenty years, to find an interested
adult before questioning a child." 7
VII. CRITIQUE OF THE FERNANDEZ DECISION
In the Fernandez decision, Justice Lemmon cited three reasons for the. court's
decision to overturn the Dino standard. He first determined that the trend toward
the per se standard had not continued, and some courts were turning away from
their prior use of per se approaches. Second, the court found that, despite
empirical studies, the totality approach adequately addressed the special needs of
juveniles. Finally, the justices cited a turn away from Louisiana's public policy to
protect juveniles, stating that, "It]he treatment accorded juveniles has undergone
a sharp shift in the twenty years since Dino was decided, as evidenced by the
Legislature's promulgation of the Children's Code and other changes in our
laws."'188
The court in Fernandez based a great deal of its reasoning on the fact that most
other jurisdictions did not have a per se requirement. However, the court did not
conduct a thorough survey of other jurisdictions when making this statement. The
court merely noted that the Dino court based much of its opinion on the Pennsylva-
nia case of Commonwealth v. Smith, 9 which was later overruled.'"' However, this
was not the only case that the Dino court had cited; it also cited cases from
Georgia"' and Indiana."9 Although the Georgia Supreme Court has also overruled
the decision cited in Dino,93 Indiana has not abandoned its decision. In fact, as
noted above, the Indiana legislature adopted the per se approach in a statute.'94
Furthermore, several other states have adopted the per se approach either through
jurisprudence or legislation.'95 Therefore, the Fernandez court should have had
more difficulty in concluding that "the principle authority on which the majority
relied in Dino has now been overruled."'"
187. Since Dino, relatively few cases have been brought alleging a violation of the standard. Only
85 Louisiana cases have cited Dino in the past twenty years, and a many of those cases dealt with the
second half of the Dino ruling, not applicable here.
188. State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 489 (La. 1998).
189. 372 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1977).
190. See Commonwealth v. Christmas, 465 A.2d 989 (Pa. 1983) (holding that the per se standard
should be a rebuttable presumption); and Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1984)
(returning the state to the totality of circumstances standard).
191. Freeman v. Wilcox, 167 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. 1969).
192. Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 1972).
193. Freeman v. Wilcox, 167 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. 1969), overruled by, Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922
(Ga. 1976).
194. Ind. Code § 31-6-7-3(a) (1999).
195. Seesupranote8l.
196. State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 488 (La. 1998). Although the Dino court cited the
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In the second section of its opinion, the court recognized the findings of the
Ferguson and Douglas study regarding a juvenile's inability to comprehend the
significance of waiving his rights; however, the court determined that the special
needs of juveniles could still be served under the totality approach. There was no
reference to the Grisso work or other studies that were presented to the court in the
Brief for the Respondent.' The court ignored the numerous studies and
recommendations which supported the previous holding requiring consultation
before allowing children to waive their rights. The court's onlyjustification under
this section of its analysis seemed to be that the majority of other jurisdictions have
agreed that the totality approach sufficiently protects the interest ofjuveniles. This
same justification was rejected in Dino. The court cited no new evidence to
warrant the Fernandez majority's departure from the court's previous findings in
this area.
Finally, in a most unusual statement, the Fernandez court stated, "The
treatment accorded juveniles has undergone a sharp shift in the twenty years since
Dino was decided... ,"9 This sentence introduced a section of the opinion
whereby the court proceeded to imply that Louisiana has lessened the special
protections provided for juveniles by the courts and the legislature since the Dino
decision. The court found that the totality of circumstances test would accommo-
date any such special needs now, despite the fact that the same court found less
than two decades ago that this test was not sufficient.
However, the court did not list one example of the legislature or the courts
lessening the protection afforded to juveniles. As the basis for this contention,
Justice Lemmon cited only the "Legislature's promulgation of the Children's Code
and other changes in our laws."'" The court reconciled this by noting the
Pennsylvania court two more times than it cited the cases from Georgia and Indiana, it was not the
"principal authority" for the court's decision. As noted above, the Dino court based its decision on
several factors, including research by scholars, heightened protection for juveniles in other areas of
Louisiana law, and case law from other states. Each of these factors played an equal role in the Dino
decision, and they were generally ignored by the court in Fernandez.
197. Supplemental Reply Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 5-19, State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d
485 (La. 1998) (No. 96-KK-2719). Also, numerous studies, including the Grisso article, supra note
112, were attached to the brief in the appendix.
198. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d at 489.
199. Id. The only "changes in our laws" mentioned was a discussion of "the blurred distinction
betweenjuvenile and adult proceedings" from C.B., R. B., T.C., R.C., S.C., 708 So. 2d 391 (La. 1998).
Also, Justice Lemmon did not cite any particular provision of the Children's Code which represented
a change in Louisiana's protections of juvenile. In fact, the Children's Code Preamble, La. C.Ch. art.
101 states, in part, that, "The people of Louisiana recognize the family as the most fundamental unit
of human society;... that the relationship between parent and child is preeminent in establishing an
maintaining the well-being of the child; ... that parents should make decisions regarding ... the
discipline of the child." Furthermore, the Children's Code recognizes in its statement of purpose,
Article 102, that, "The provisions of this Code shall be liberally construed to the end that each child and
parent coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall receive... the care, guidance, and control that
will be conducive to his welfare." (emphasis added). These statements suggest that the purpose of the
Children's Code was not to lessen protections afforded to juveniles, as the Fernandez court suggests,
but instead, it was meant to maintain the protection of Louisiana's juveniles and assure that the state
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provisions cited in Dino were "legislative decisions, while the Dino requirements
are not."200 It did not address the list found in the Brief for the Defendant-
Respondent of more than 150 constitutional provisions, Civil Code articles, and
effective statutes in which the state legislature has made a special exception for or
created a special protection for juveniles.2 ' Moreover, the current increase in
juvenile crime indicates that children today have less guidance and education than
they did twenty years ago, making them possibly more in need of special
protection from the state. If children are so much more sophisticated today, then
the laws that the state currently enforces limiting the capacity of juveniles to
contract or conduct other adult transactions seem unnecessary.
Courts agree with the legislature that children are not capable of making long
term contractual decisions; however, the Fernandez court held that a child does
have the capacity to waive a constitutional right which could make the difference
between freedom and permanent incarceration. This is a serious inconsistency in
Louisiana's treatment of juveniles. The court was correct when it said the
legislature did not codify the Dino decision expressly. However, in 1991, the
legislature created the first Louisiana Children's Code to arrange pre-existing
statutes concerning children into one source, while eliminating inconsistencies and
ambiguities. Children's Code article 808 formally recognized the constitutional
rights of a child.2' The legislature recognized the incapacity of a juvenile in
Article 855, mandating that when a child appears to answer a petition, the court
must first "determine that the child is capable of understanding statements about
his rights .... '" Furthermore, the legislature did codify the Dino requirements to
used its best efforts to insure parental participation in a child's life, and that its actions continue to be
in the best interest of a child in its custody.
200. Id.
201. Brief for the Defendant-Respondent at 102-13. State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485 (La. 1998)
(No. 96-KK-2719). For a brief overview of some of these statutes, see infra note 210.
202. La. Ch.C. article 808 reads in part:
All rights guaranteed to criminal defendants by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of Louisiana, except the right tojurytrial, shall be applicable to juvenile court
proceedings brought under this Tide.
For a review of Article 808, see generally, Jan Kirby Byland, Connent, Louisiana's Children Code
Article 808: A Positive Step on behalf of Louisiana's Children, 52 La. L Rev. 1141 (1992).
203. La. Ch.C. art. 855 states:
A. When the child appears to answer the petition, the court shall first determine that the
child is capable of understanding statements about his rights under this Code.
B. If the child is capable, the court shall then advise the child of the following items in
terms understandable to the child:
(1) The nature of this delinquency proceeding.
(2) The nature of the allegations of the petition.
(3) His right to an adjudication hearing.
(4) His right to be represented by an attorney, his right to have counsel appointed as
provided in Article 809, and his right in certain circumstances authorized by Article
810 to waive counsel.
(5) His privilege against self-incrimination.
(6) The range of responses authorized under Article 856.
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the extent it provided that ajudge cannot allow a child to waive his right to counsel
without first determining that the child has "consulted with an attorney or other
adult interested in the child's welfare... ."' This demonstrates the legislature's
recognition of a child's inability to understand at least one of his constitutional
rights without adult assistance.
It is also important to note that Louisiana has codified a "Rule of Fourteen" in
regards to allowing juveniles to be prosecuted as adults. Louisiana Children's
Code article 857 allows a court to transfer a juvenile to a court of criminal
jurisdiction only if the child is fourteen years of age or older at the time of the
offense, and then, only under limited circumstances." 5
Although the Children's Code contains hundreds of instances in which the
state has made special protections available to juveniles, it is not the only place
where the state has provided such protections. Numerous laws currently in effect
protect children from their immaturity. Children are not allowed to purchase
tobacco products,' weapons,' or sexually explicit materials, including magazine,
(7) The possible consequences of his admission that the allegations arm true, including
the maximum and minimal dispositions which the court might impose pursuant to
Articles 897 through 900.
204. La. Ch.C. art. 810 provides in part:
A. The court may allow a child to waive the assistance of counsel if the court determines
that all of the following exists:
(1) The child has consulted with an attorney or other adult interested in the child's
welfare.
(2) That both the child and the adult advisor have been instructed by the court about the
child's rights and the possible consequences of waiver.
(3) That the child is voluntarily waiving his right to counsel.
(emphasis added in text and footnote).
205. La. Ch.C. art. 857 states:
A. The court on its own motion or on motion of the district attorney may conduct a hearing
to consider whether to transfer a child for prosecution to the appropriate court exercising
criminal jurisdiction if a delinquency petition has been filed which alleges that a child who
is fourteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged offense but is
not otherwise subject to the original jurisdiction of a court exercising criminal jurisdiction
has committed any one or more of the following crimes:
(1) First degree murder.
(2) Second degree murder.
(3) Aggravated kidnaping.
(4) Aggravated rape.
(5) Aggravated battery when committed by the discharge of a firearm.
(6) Armed robbery when committed with a firearm.
(7) Aggravated oral sexual battery.
(8) Forcible rape if the rape is committed upon a child at least two years younger than
the rapist.
B. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a fourteen-year-old who is
transferred pursuant to this Article and subsequently convicted shall not be confined for
such conviction beyond his thirty-first birthday.
206. La. R.S. 14:91.8 (Supp. 1999).
207. La. R.S. 14:91 (Supp. 1999).
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books, videos, or musical recordings. 2°1 In the past two years, two important
statutes have been amended to protect minors. In 1996, the legislature enacted
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:93.11 that placed an absolute prohibition on the sale
of alcohol to anyone under the age of twenty-one. In 1997, it amended the motor
vehicles statutes to allow only persons sixteen and older to obtain a driver's
licence, and only upon completion of a driver's education course and after
obtaining parental consent.2° These statutes demonstrate that the Fernandez
majority was incorrect when it stated there has been a turn away from Louisiana's
public policy of protecting juveniles.21°
It must also be noted that a review of the reported cases dealing with the Dino
decision did not show that the courts were having serious problems applying the
standard. Most of the ambiguities that the court left in the Dino decision actually
gave the courts great flexibility in allowing juvenile confessions. In the aftermath
of the Dino decision, the courts limited the ruling to juveniles under the age of
seventeen,2 ' and used the "interested adult" language to allow a variety of persons
to qualify as appropriate advisors for the juveniles. 2 Furthermore, the majority
of the circuits construed the "meaningful consultation" requirement so broadly that
essentially, all that was needed to meet that requirement was the mere presence of
the adult at the time the waiver form is read and during the interrogation. 2 '3
Consequently, the per se approach, at least as it seems it was being applied in
Louisiana, was not an inflexible, "prophylactic rule" whereby juvenile delinquents
were being released based upon mere "technicalities." The supreme court's
208. La. R.S. 14:91.11 (Supp. 1999).
209. La. R.S. 32:405.1 and 32:407 (Supp. 1999).
.210. A listing of every Louisiana law extending increased protections to minors, or limiting their
rights due to immaturity would be lengthy and well beyond the scope of this paper; however, some
additional, more notable statutes include: La. Const. art. I § 10 (right to vote); La. Civ. Code art. 29
(age of majority); La. Civ. Code art. 385 (emancipation only of minors ages sixteen or older); La. Code
Crim. P. art. 905.2 (aggravating circumstances for capital offenses); La. R.S. 14:30 (1997) (first degree
murder, victim under age twelve); La. R.S. 14:42 (1997) (aggravated rape); La. R.S. 14:78.1 (Supp.
1999) (aggravate incest); La. R.S. 14:79.1 (Supp. 1999) (criminal abandonment of minors); La. R.S.
14:80 (Supp. 1999) (carnal knowledge of a juvenile); La. R.S. 14:81 (Supp. 1999) (indecent behavior
with a juvenile); La. R.S. 14:81.1 (Supp. 1999) (pornography involving juveniles); La. R.S. 14:81.2
(Supp. 1999) (molestation of a juvenile); La. R.S. 14:91.21 (1986) (sale of poisonous reptiles to
minors); La. R.S. 14:92 (Supp. 1999) (contributing to the delinquency of minors); La. R.S. 14:93.2
(Supp. 1999) (tattoos on minors); La. R.S. 14:98 (Supp. 1999) (driving while intoxicated, child
endangerment); La. R.S. 14:286 (Supp. 1999) (sale of a minor child); La. R.S. 14:403 (Supp. 1999)
(abuse of children); La. R.S. 23:161-214 (1998) (limiting right to work to minors over fourteen and
prohibiting minors from certain occupations); La. R.S. 40:1033.1 (1992) (prohibiting the minors from
being in any establishment exhibiting drug paraphernalia).
211. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. See also State v. Gachot, 609 So. 2d 269 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1992) (where court held that confession was not rendered invalid where the defendant and
his older brother were never left alone by police during the interrogation when defendant was charged
with murdering both his parents).
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reconsideration of the Dino policy was unnecessary. This was not a rule that was
causing an enormous amount of conflicting litigation to the detriment of society. 14
VIII. CONCLUSION
Without the protection of the Dino requirements, the state's children are
subject to an outdated, unpredictable, discretionary standard by which courts will
determine their futures. The court's ruling in Fernandez could have a detrimental
impact on the rights of children in Louisiana. Before Fernandez, commentators
and other courts consistently cited Louisiana approvingly as one of the few states
in the nation willing to recognize the need for heightened protection of juveniles.
With this decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court has returned Louisiana to one of
the majority of states which chose to ignore the strong evidence that children
should be afforded greater protection than adults..
The totality of circumstances test is problematic and will inevitably lead to
inconsistent results. The state legislature should amend the Louisiana Children's
Code to include a per se requirement by which the courts will determine the
effectiveness of ajuvenile's waiver of rights, effectively overruling the Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision in Fernandez. This provision should include the three
basic requirements of the Dino standard: (1) before ajuvenile may effect a waiver
of rights, he or she must consult with an attorney, parent, guardian, or other
interested adult; (2) the adult advisor and the child must both be informed of the
child's constitutional rights; and (3) the adult advisor must have no interest adverse
to the child.
Of all the criticisms of the per se approach, the only one which continues to
have substantial merit is the argument that the requirement can be too stringent in
cases of older, more mature juveniles. Instances arise where an otherwise valid
confession.would be inadmissible due to a violation of theper se requirement. For
example, a near seventeen-year-old who has extensive experience with the judicial
system and an above normal level of intelligence is probably as competent as most
adults to make a valid waiver of his rights. However, under the traditional per se
approach, this waiver would be invalid without consultation with an adult. These
cases are among those limited circumstances where the interest of the state in
justice may outweigh the benefits of such a requirement. However, a "Rule of
Fourteen" or similar standard would solve this difficulty. It would allow the courts
to use a more appropriate totality approach in this case, while maintaining
increased protection for a less mature class ofjuveniles. Such a rule would also be
consistent with Louisiana's requirement that children under fourteen cannot be
prosecuted as adults."' If they cannot be prosecuted as an adult, why should they
be subject to the same treatment as adults when they are being interrogated? This
214. In fact, as noted above, there were only 85 reported Louisiana cases which even mentioned
the Dino opinion. Of those, only a small few resulted in the suppression of thejuvenile's confession.
215. La. Ch.C. art. 857.
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has been an argument of several states adopting a "Rule of Fourteen" standard, and
it applies equally in Louisiana.
Also, concern remains that the children would still not be properly advised in
some cases, even under the per se approach. The studies by scholars such as
Grisso show that many adults do not understand their own Miranda rights;
therefore, how can they properly advise their children? This is a valid concern. In
response, the legislature's statute should require that if there is evidence that the
available adult has an interest contrary to that of the child, or if the child and the
parent cannot agree on the waiver decision, there must be a mandatory consultation
with an attorney. Since the Children's Code already requires that a juvenile be
represented by counsel at all juvenile proceedings unless they have effected a valid
waiver,216 it would not be much of an additional burden for the police to withhold
interrogation until the child can obtain such counsel. The child has a right to
remain silent, which if invoked, would prohibit police from interrogating the child
at any time; it should be required that any such interrogation be postponed until a
child can understand the ramifications of waiving this right. Furthermore, an
attorney could actually increase the efficiency of interrogations by helping the child
to provide clear and concise answers to difficult and confusing questions.
The current standard, however, is not acceptable. It is untenable to believe
with the volumes of current research and data that a child could fully comprehend
the gravity of his decision to waive his right to remain silent in a police interroga-
tion. Parents teach young children to respect the authority of police officers and
other adults; they are easily frightened and influenced. Their first instinct will
generally be to offer information to the officer questioning them. Research shows
that they are not likely to admit that they do not understand what is happening to
them.2 " It is no secret that police officers are seeking to obtain confessions from
suspects in custody, not to warn children of reasons why speaking to the officer
would be disadvantageous to the child. Without the requirements of Dino, there
is no guarantee that the child will fully understand the ramifications of making a
statement to the officer. Such decisions should not be left to an officer and a
judge's discretion. It should be proscribed by law.
Penelope Alysse Brobst"
216. As noted above, such a waiver can only be effected after consultation with an attorney or
interested adult, which is already a heightened standard. La. Ch.C. arts. 809-10.
217. See generally Grisso, supra note 112; see also Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 24.
* The author wishes to thank John M. Devlin, Edwin W. Edwards Professor of Law, Louisiana
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